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Daily Mutual Fund Flows and Redemption Policies 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine how redemption policies affect daily fund flows in open-end mutual funds. Since 
short-term trading of fund shares, as manifested in daily fund flows, can have an adverse impact 
on returns to the fund’s shareholders, mutual funds might find it desirable to discourage short-
term trading through the use of redemption fees. However, if daily fund flows are due to fund 
shareholders’ legitimate liquidity demands, the redemption fee would have little effect on daily 
fund flows and possibly adversely affect fund shareholders by imposing a liquidity cost on them. 
We find that the likelihood of a fund charging a redemption fee is largely a function of its overall 
fee structure.  We also use a sample of funds that imposed redemption fees to examine whether 
the distribution of daily fund flows changes after the initiation of the redemption fee. We find 
that the redemption fee is an effective tool in controlling the volatility of fund flows. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 In addition to the potential benefits of professional investment management and 
diversification, open-end mutual funds offer the privilege of nearly free and unlimited liquidity. 
Most funds grant shareholders the right to exchange fund shares for cash at its end-of-day per 
share net asset value (NAV). Shareholders typically pay no direct costs when exercising this 
right to exchange shares, despite the possibility that these exchanges impose costs on the fund’s 
remaining shareholders through increased expenses and lowered realized returns. While 
numerous studies explore the performance of  funds’ portfolio  managers, more recent scrutiny 
focuses on how the liquidity feature of mutual funds affects  performance.1 This paper examines 
mutual funds’ attempts to restrict the sale of fund shares through fund policies such as 
redemption fees. 
 Mutual fund shareholders redeem their shares for several reasons. Typically, redemptions 
are considered to be motivated by infrequent liquidity shocks or regular asset allocation 
decisions. These liquidity motives are similar to those of the uninformed liquidity traders in the 
models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). 
Liquidity-motivated and infrequent redemptions that are uncorrelated over time should not 
impact the fund manager’s portfolio selection strategy and should not result in significant costs 
to the fund. However, Edelen (1999) suggests that excessive fund flows can have detrimental 
effects on mutual fund performance, and attributes the effect on performance to transaction costs 
arising from the adjustment of the underlying portfolio holdings and the need to carry cash to 
fund liquidations. 
                                                          
1 Studies of overall fund performance include Carhart (1997), Grinblatt and Titman (1994), Gruber (1996), 
Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Ippolito (1989, 1992), and Jensen (1968). Studies that consider the 
liquidity of fund shares and its impact on performance include Alexander, Cici, and Gibson (2005) Bergstresser and 
Poterba (2002), Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm (2000), and Edelen (1999). 
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Some shareholders might trade fund shares in order to engage in market-timing or short-
term speculative trading. Among these traders, some might redeem shares in order to exploit a 
possible mis-pricing in the fund's per share NAV. Bhargava and Dubofsky (1998), Zitzewitz 
(2003), and Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (2001) show that funds’ NAV’s can be mis-priced on 
average due to the stale prices of the fund's underlying assets. Greene and Hodges (2002) show 
that traders have exploited stale-priced trading opportunities in international funds, significantly 
diluting fund returns. In addition to the adverse impact of strategically timed fund flows, the 
shifting of capital-gains tax liabilities to passive investors can lead to even greater dilution of 
after-tax fund returns, as suggested by Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm (2000). 
Fund managers might attempt to limit the effects of these fund exchanges. Chordia 
(1996) presents a model in which fund managers choose policies (an exchange fee in the model) 
to entice investors to self-select into funds based on their liquidity needs. Nanda, Narayanan, and 
Warther (2000) construct a model in which the heterogeneity of managerial ability and the 
differences in investors’ liquidity needs determine the fees charged by a fund. Managers who can 
earn higher returns may be able to charge higher fees to deter liquidity traders. Similarly, Nanda 
and Singh (1998) construct a model in which the endogenous liquidity needs of investors lead 
them to form a mutual fund, while also determining the fee structure and size of the fund. In their 
model, funds that are more efficient in managing transaction costs (including the costs arising 
from fund redemptions and taxes) will have lower penalties for early withdrawal. Because these 
models depend on the power of transaction fees to discourage fund flows, it is important to 
examine empirical evidence on the impact of redemption fees on investors’ liquidity demands as 
reflected in fund flows.  
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Besides controlling flows by restricting active trading of fund shares, fund managers who 
are compensated based on assets under management have an incentive to discourage 
shareholders from redeeming fund shares. Since redemption fees could be a way for managers of 
poorly performing funds to “capture” investors by imposing a fee for exit, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) historically was reluctant to encourage widespread use of these 
fees (Stanton 2000a). The SEC has encouraged mutual funds to set redemption fees based on an 
estimation of the costs that the redemption imposes on the fund (SEC, 2002) – usually a function 
of the transaction costs the fund paid to liquidate shares of its underlying assets. In the face of 
increased attention on the impact of market-timing, the SEC shifted its position in March 2005 
and gave its blessing and encouragement to impose redemption fees, particularly for short-term 
holding periods. With the adoption of Rule 22c-2 to the Investment Company Act of 1940, the 
SEC requires all funds either to charge a redemption fee, or to determine that such a fee is not 
necessary (Burns 2005). Even with these justifications, the SEC continues to discourage fees 
exceeding 2%, although Rule 22c-2 does not state a formal cap on redemption fees.2  
Funds make clear in their prospectuses that redemption fees exist specifically in order to 
discourage market timing strategies. For example, the prospectus for the UAM McKee 
International Equity fund states that the fund “… charges the redemption fee to discourage 
market timing by those shareholders initiating redemptions to take advantage of short-term 
market movements” (UAM, 2000).  
This paper empirically examines two competing explanations of why funds use 
redemption fees. An agency cost hypothesis for redemption fees implies that poor performing 
funds are more likely to have such fees, while a liquidity cost hypothesis suggests that funds with 
                                                          
2 For example, Stanton (2000b, 2000c) explains how Fidelity’s Small Cap Stock Fund reduced its redemption fee 
from 3% to 2% at the insistence of the SEC. Fidelity argued that costs imposed by short-term traders justified a 3% 
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greater potential transaction costs would be more likely to employ redemption fees. In addition, 
we explore how effectively redemption fees affect investors’ exchange behavior. We take two 
approaches in our examination. First, we examine whether the characteristics of a fund’s 
structure explains the use of redemption fees. To do this, we compare the characteristics of funds 
that have redemption fees with those that do not. Our second approach relates the fund’s 
redemption fee to its shareholders’ exchange activity. In this context, we examine how 
redemption fees affect the distribution of frequent (daily) fund flows.  
 In practice, fund managers have several exchange policies at their disposal for inhibiting 
shareholders’ ability to exchange fund shares, including prospectus-stated exchange restrictions, 
market timing language, exchange or redemption fees, minimum holding periods, and load fees. 
We choose to focus on redemption fees for several reasons. First, redemption fees typically are 
charged to the person performing an exchange and are paid directly to the fund. This is in 
contrast to load fees or some exchange fees that are paid to the fund management company or a 
third party (e.g., a broker). Thus, redemption fees impose costs on investors leaving the fund and 
compensate existing shareholders for any costs the fund must pay to rebalance the portfolio. 
Although many studies have examined the impact of fees and transaction costs on investment 
performance, existing empirical work suggests that investors’ flows respond more to reported 
returns than the fee structure (Odean, Barber, and Zheng, 2006). It is also important to note that 
almost all of the published studies cited here were conducted in the period prior to the SEC’s 
new focus on redemption fees as a tool to combat excessive fund flows.  This paper documents 
the impact of redemption fee changes on daily mutual fund flows during the final period when 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
fee.    
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funds were free to initiate redemption fees as they saw fit and offers evidence on their 
effectiveness in controlling liquidity and performance3. 
 The importance of fees in deterring investors’ share redemptions is also relevant to 
models of financial intermediation. Several of these models employ production technologies 
where value is lost if investments are liquidated early. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) note that 
such a result would be equivalent to a transaction cost on liquidating the investment. The 
importance of this cost of withdrawing funds from an investment is a major factor in the models 
of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Jacklin (1993), and Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992), just 
to name a few. Most of these papers concentrate on bank deposits, but the use of fees to deter 
frequent trading of mutual funds has many similarities. Therefore, a better understanding of the 
influence of redemption fees on investors’ willingness to withdraw from certain investments is 
important for the applicability of these models as well. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section establishes the 
methodology and key predictions that we examine using a sample of all Lipper and CRSP listed 
mutual funds. Using this sample, we conduct cross-sectional analysis of funds with and without 
redemption fees. We examine daily fund flows in section 3, where we conduct both cross-
sectional analysis and a time-series event study of funds that initiate redemption fees during our 
sample periods. Section 4 summarizes and offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
2.1 Methodology 
                                                          
3  We note that the impact of a redemption fee might be different in an environment in which relatively few 
competing funds have a redemption fee compared to an environment in which most funds have one. 
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 Fund managers often claim that redemption fees are used to decrease redemption-
generated liquidity costs imposed on remaining shareholders. However, the SEC’s refusal to 
raise the 2% cap on redemption fees implies that there exists the potential for a serious agency 
problem where fund managers impose unnecessary fees on shareholders. Therefore, it is 
important for shareholders, fund managers, and financial regulators to know if funds really use 
redemption fees when they are faced with high liquidity costs, or alternatively, when they are 
faced with high potential agency costs.  
An agency cost explanation for redemption fees implies that managers use redemption 
fees to prevent investors from leaving the fund. Managers could be motivated to capture investor 
dollars in this way whenever conditions exist that benefit fund managers but hurt investors. Such 
funds could be characterized by high expenses and/or poor performance. High expense ratios, 
especially the management (non-12b-1) portion of expenses, would lead to greater payments to 
fund managers, without directly benefiting shareholders.4 Alternatively, investors in poorly 
performing funds would have an incentive to shift assets to a better managed fund, unless 
discouraged from doing so by a redemption fee. Since fund manager compensation usually 
depends on the size of assets under management, they would have a strong incentive to prevent 
such defections. The ability of redemption fees to prevent defections from poorly performing 
funds holds particular importance in potentially helping to explain the asymmetric relation 
between mutual fund flow and performance5. Costs, such as redemption fees, that prevent 
investors from leaving poorly performing funds could help explain such asymmetries by showing 
why investors remain in funds with persistently low returns.  
                                                          
4 Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), and Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (1999), all show that funds with higher expense 
ratios do not necessarily provide investors with higher returns. 
5 Sirri and Tufano (1998) document an asymmetric relationship between fund flow and performance, with well-
performing funds attracting large inflows, although most poorly-performing funds do not experience large outflows. 
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A final consideration in fund managers’ motivations to use redemption fees is to examine 
how redemption fees influence the growth of a fund’s assets. If redemption fees lead to slower 
fund growth then we could expect that smaller funds would be less likely to use redemption fees 
to induce higher growth rates. However, once a fund’s size reaches a suitable level, then 
management’s concern with asset growth could lessen, and redemption fees may become a more 
attractive means of controlling investors’ behavior. 
 The liquidity explanation for redemption fees suggests that managers use these fees to 
control liquidity costs that could reduce investors’ returns. Under this explanation, managers act 
in the best interests of long-term shareholders when imposing redemption fees. As Bhargava and 
Dubofsky (1998), Zitzewitz (2003), Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (2001), and Greene and 
Hodges (2002) show, investors taking advantage of short-term market-timing strategies can earn 
excess returns at the expense of passive shareholders. This occurs because stale prices lead to 
some predictability in mutual fund NAVs, while free redemptions allow for unlimited and 
costless liquidity to be provided to short-term traders at the expense of passive investors.  
We employ two separate data sources to examine how mutual funds use redemption fees. 
First, we examine data for the years 2000-2003 from Lipper, Inc., which indicates if a fund 
charges a redemption fee. We then merge this sample with the CRSP mutual fund database to 
obtain returns, fund characteristics, and fees.  This sample admits an examination of the 
characteristics of funds that utilize redemption fees compared with those that do not. To select 
our sample of funds, we require that CRSP have non-missing data for the following mutual fund 
characteristics for at least two of the four sample years: total net assets (TNA), annual returns, 
turnover, expense ratios, 12b-1 fees, cash holdings, and investment objective. We then identify 
funds by broad investment objective: domestic equity funds, domestic bond funds, and 
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international equity funds. International bond funds, balanced or mixed funds, money market 
funds, and others that do not clearly fit our classifications are discarded. We also remove funds 
that report average annual total net assets of less than $10 million. 
Lipper also provides an additional database of daily TNA’s for all funds in our sample, 
from which we can compute daily fund flows.  Although Lipper reports daily ending TNA for 
each fund, this TNA figure does not reflect the current day’s net fund flows6. Therefore, we 
calculate daily flows as: 
  t
t
t
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ac −+= +
+
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1 , (1) 
where at is total net assets on day t, rt is the fund’s return on day t, and ct is fund flow on day t. 
To get percentage flows we then divide (1) by at /(1+rt).   
 We take two approaches in examining the characteristics of funds charging redemption 
fees. First, we use cross-sectional analysis to compare funds that have redemption fees to those 
that do not. As with any cross-sectional comparison, suspicion may arise as to whether the 
characteristics that influence daily fund flows are suitably controlled. Therefore, our second 
approach relies on an event-study of funds that initiate redemption fees. Our event study sample 
comprises fifty-eight funds that initiated redemption fees during our four-year sample period. 
This complements our cross-sectional analysis by holding the characteristics of the fund constant 
and examining only the changed fund policy with respect to redemption fees. 
  
                                                          
6 Funds’ reporting of TNA and the inclusion of the current day’s net flows is an issue of concern in other databases 
of daily fund flows such as the Trimtabs database used by Greene and Hodges (2002), Zitzewitz (2003), and 
Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (2001). We follow the procedure of Greene and Hodges (2002) and match a sub-
sample of our funds to the semi-annual SEC N-SAR filings in order to validate the timing of the TNA figure 
reported by Lipper.  This confirms that Lipper does report the TNA consistently for the vast majority of our funds.  
In our cross-sectional analysis we assume that all funds report TNA pre-flow, as misclassified figures for TNA are 
unlikely to affect this portion of our analysis.  Moving to a more detailed examination of flows in the next section, 
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2.2 Cross-Sectional Sample Data 
 Table 1 offers descriptive statistics of funds with valid data from the merged sample, with 
means over the sample period of fund characteristics reported separately for funds with and 
without redemption fees. The overall sample includes 190 funds with redemption fees and 4,379 
funds without redemption fees. Counted among these “funds” are multiple classes of the same 
fund (e.g., Class A or B shares). Because redemption fees often apply to only one class of shares, 
we conduct all analysis at the share class level, and we do not aggregate separate classes into one 
fund.  
 Table 2 presents a more detailed description of the redemption fees charged by our 
sample funds. Overall, in 2000 there are 57 domestic equity growth funds (5.1%) with 
redemption fees, 9 domestic equity income funds (2.1%), 33 international equity funds (8.5%), 
and 33 domestic bond funds (2.9%). By 2003 the percentage charging redemption fees had 
steadily increased for all investment objectives, with 250 domestic equity growth funds (11.4%), 
45 domestic equity income funds (6.1%), 252 international equity funds (37.0%), and 116 
domestic bond funds (5.1%) charging redemption fees.  
 While the average redemption fee charged for most fund classes rose over the sample 
period, most funds levying a redemption fee set it at the maximum allowed fee of 2%. The 
proportion of funds charging this maximum fee also steadily increased, from 57.9% of domestic 
equity growth funds with redemption fees in 2000 to 86.4% in 2003, with other investment 
objectives displaying a similar pattern.  
  
2.3 Cross Sectional Empirical Results 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
we verify each fund against the N-SARs and adjust the flow calculation for any funds that report daily TNA using 
the current day’s flows.    
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Our cross-sectional results are consistent with redemption fees being part of an overall 
fee structure.  In the univariate tests presented in Table 1, marketing (12b-1) fees and loads are 
consistently and significantly lower for funds charging redemption fees. Management fees are 
significantly lower for domestic income and bond funds with redemption fees.  Other variables 
show mixed or insignificant differences. The lower marketing fees and loads for funds charging 
redemption fees seem consistent with the idea that funds are “locking in” investors. However, 
lower marketing expenses could benefit infrequent traders who do not face an expected 
redemption cost. Evidence concerning fund size and the level of fund flows is inconclusive in 
these tests7. There is no evidence that funds charging redemption fees suffer from worse 
performance or higher fees than other funds.  In fact, domestic growth and international equity 
funds charging redemption fees have significantly higher risk-adjusted performance. 
 Table 3 reports probit model estimates of fund characteristics that determine if a fund has 
a redemption fee. The probit model takes the form: 
Redemption Fee Dummyi = β0 + β1Alphai + β2ManagementFeesi + β3MarketingFeesi 
+ β4Size + β5Turnover + β6CashHoldings + β7FrontLoadi + ei,.   (2) 
For Growth and Income funds, performance is measured by a 1-factor market model of monthly 
returns with the S&P 500 Index as a benchmark.  Each fund’s monthly returns over the sample 
period are regressed on the monthly returns for the S&P 500 index.  The intercept from this 
model measures performance and is referred to as alpha8.  One-factor models for International 
                                                          
7 An additional variable that is inconclusive when included in these tests is the serial correlation of daily fund flows.  
This variable could be used as a measure of a fund’s susceptibility to market-timing trading.  We do find in t-tests 
between groups that international funds charging a redemption fee have significantly smaller levels of negative 
serial correlation of daily flow than funds not charging redemption fees.  However, this variable is not significant in 
any probit regressions and does not change the coefficients for any other variables, and is therefore omitted from our 
analysis. 
8 Our results are robust to the use of several alternative performance measures, such as raw returns, expense-adjusted 
returns, and multi-factor return models including market, book-to-market, size, and momentum factors.  We also 
obtain similar results when using daily returns instead of monthly returns to measure performance. 
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and Bond funds are calculated similarly, except that for international funds we use the MSCI 
EAFE index as the benchmark, and for bond funds we use the Fed Reserve AA Aggregate 
Corporate Bond Index as a benchmark.  MarketingFees is the 12b-1 portion of fund i’s expense 
ratio, and ManagementFees is the non-12b-1 portion. Turnover is the fund’s turnover ratio. Size 
is the natural log of a fund’s average daily total net assets and Cash Holdings is the percentage of 
a fund’s assets in cash and cash equivalents.  FrontLoad represents the maximum front-end load 
that may be charged for this fund class.  Because deferred loads demonstrate a complicated 
interaction with redemption fees, we do not include them now, but present a more detailed 
analysis of them in the next section.   
 The probit results in Table 3 are fairly similar across fund objectives and reveal some 
interesting findings. The pseudo-R2 statistics range from 23.5% for domestic growth funds to 
29.3% for international equity funds. As in the univariate analysis, there is no significant 
evidence that funds with redemption fees have worse performance; indeed, international equity 
and domestic growth funds actually have significantly positive coefficients for risk-adjusted 
returns.  Management fees take a positive coefficient but are only significant for domestic 
growth funds, while cash holdings and turnover show no consistent or significant patterns across 
investment objectives. The strongest results are for marketing fees and front loads, which have 
significant negative coefficients.  The strength of the findings for 12b-1 fees and front loads, 
combined with the lack of significance for portfolio-based variables such as turnover and cash 
holdings, indicates that the likelihood of a fund charging a redemption fee is largely a function of 
its overall fee structure and marketing strategy, and not determined by its portfolio 
characteristics.  
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Funds that charge marketing based fees (12b-1 fees and front loads) are less likely to use 
redemption fees. This is consistent with our agency explanation of redemption fees. The 
significant positive coefficients for management fees for funds with redemption fees support this 
interpretation.  Cash holdings are insignificant in the probit model for all types of funds, 
suggesting that funds do not hold less cash when a redemption fee is present.   
 
2.4 Cross Sectional Analysis of Redemption Fees and Deferred Loads 
Because deferred loads (contingent deferred sales loads, or CDSLs) bear such a strong 
resemblance to redemption fees, we take a closer look at the relationship between these two 
types of fees.  After merging the CRSP and Lipper databases, we discovered that the CRSP 
database occasionally misclassified redemption fees as deferred loads.  Further investigation (via 
internet and/or contacting the fund families directly for the subsample of our funds that initiated 
redemption fees) confirmed that the fees in question were indeed redemption fees and not 
deferred loads.  This motivated us to omit the variable for deferred loads from the analysis in the 
previous section.  Had we included the deferred load variable, as reported by CRSP, it would 
take a significant positive coefficient for all investment objectives, while management fees 
become insignificant for domestic income and domestic bond funds (results available from the 
authors).  Instead of including deferred loads in our probit model, we present Table 4, where 
funds are classified by whether or not they charge a deferred load (as reported by CRSP), and the 
probit model is run separately for each group.   
The results presented in Table 4 are consistent across all fund investment objectives and 
are robust to our alternative performance measures.  Overall, the significant negative coefficients 
for marketing (12b-1) fees, and the power of our probit models in general (measured by the 
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pseudo-R-square) applies only for funds that charge deferred loads.   We also find that 
management fees now take a significant negative coefficient for domestic growth and bond funds 
that also charge deferred loads.  For funds without deferred loads, our probit model has little 
power to explain which funds charge redemption fees.  Therefore, it seems that for funds 
charging a deferred load, redemption fees and 12b-1 fees are strongly negatively related.  For 
funds that do not charge a deferred load, redemption fees are largely unrelated to the variables 
included in our model. This provides further evidence that redemption fees are part of a fund’s 
overall marketing strategy and fee structure. 
 
2.5 Cross Sectional Analysis of Other Market Timing Restrictions 
 In this section, we extend the results of Greene and Hodges (2002) by examining how 
fund flows are affected by other restrictions on shareholders’ purchases and redemptions. To 
examine these issues, we partition the year-2003 data9 by investment restrictions including 
redemption fees, minimum initial investment amounts, purchase constraints, front-end loads, and 
deferred loads. We then conduct a t-test for the difference in means and an F-test for differences 
in standard deviations for funds with and without each restriction or fee. “Purchase constraints” 
refer to limits on fund access, such as when a fund is closed to new investors, closed to all 
investors, or restricted to investors from certain groups, such as employees in a certain 
profession. Minimum initial investment amounts and purchase constraints are obtained from the 
Morningstar Principia database. Loads are from the CRSP mutual fund database and all other 
data are from Lipper.  
                                                          
9 For clarity, we report results only for year-2003 data in this section, although the use of alternative sample years 
yields similar findings. 
 15
 Table 5, Panel A, shows the average level and standard deviation of daily fund flows for 
the sample, partitioned by investment restrictions. Panel B presents these statistics for absolute 
daily flows, which are more relevant when considering the overall response of investors to 
redemption fees.  Most of these alternative restrictions on fund flows do not demonstrate a 
consistent impact, especially across investment objectives. Funds with redemption fees tend to 
have a lower standard deviation of daily flows (except for domestic income funds), but a higher 
standard deviation of absolute flows.  Minimum initial investment amounts of greater than 
$1,000 significantly decrease the standard deviation of both daily flows and absolute flows, 
which would be consistent with small retail investors creating the volatility in fund flows.  Funds 
with deferred loads also tend to have significantly lower absolute flows and lower standard 
deviations of absolute flows, although they have a higher standard deviation of signed flows for 
domestic income and bond funds. Purchase constraints do not have a consistent impact in flows 
across investment objectives.  
 A challenge in the cross-sectional examination of fund flows and redemption fees, as well 
as other trading restrictions, is that we can not distinguish between cause and effect.  Although 
we can clearly observe the characteristics of funds that charge redemption fees, we cannot 
determine whether the fees cause the fund to have such characteristics, or if those characteristics 
cause the fund to charge a redemption fee.  For example, do redemption fees serve to decrease 
the standard deviation of daily fund flows by suppressing trading, or do funds with unusually 
volatile absolute flows choose to charge redemption fees in order to try to control those flows?  
Our next section attempts to disentangle the nature of causality by examining only those funds 
that initiate redemption fees during our sample period. 
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3. Analysis of Redemption Fee Initiations 
3.1 Event-Study Methodology 
 Redemption fees for most funds are only applied to redemptions within a certain 
minimum holding period, generally lasting between one week and one year. Because these fees 
do not penalize shareholders who redeem after longer holding periods, they appear to be aimed at 
thwarting fund shareholders who trade more actively than do other shareholders. Whether daily 
fund flows reflect the liquidity demands of short-term traders or those of long-term traders in 
each fund is unknown. If daily fund flows typically reflect the long-term shareholders’ liquidity 
demands, then the redemption fees might fail to curb exchanges. This would result in no 
significant change in fund flows after the initiation of a redemption fee. Alternatively, if daily 
fund flows originate from traders who engage in market timing or other strategic trading, these 
redemption fees should raise their costs and significantly affect their trading activity. It is 
important to note that redemption fees might not be enforceable on all shareholders who actively 
trade fund shares. Some shareholders might exchange fund shares through a third party, such as a 
fund supermarket or retirement plan. In these cases, third parties typically batch exchange orders 
and transmit a single net exchange order to the fund company. This renders detection of 
individual traders impossible, unless the third party enforces each fund’s policy. Whether the 
redemption fee event causes a decrease in daily fund flows depends on whether any fund traders 
who were previously engaged in active trading change their behavior because of the redemption 
fee. 
The use of redemption fees recently has been targeted at thwarting flows from strategic 
traders. Greene and Hodges (2002) and Zitzewitz (2003) show that traders of international 
mutual fund shares exploit significant serial correlation by following a simple trading rule. The 
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trading rule is to exchange into an international mutual fund at the close of trading on days that 
the U.S. market is up (i.e., has a positive return) and exchange out of the fund when the U.S. 
market drops. This strategy profits from the correlation of international markets with the U.S. 
market. Greene and Hodges estimate a significant transfer of wealth from passive, buy-and-hold 
shareholders to these active market timers. To a lesser extent, this strategy could also work for 
domestic equity and bond funds as long as their holdings are illiquid enough to allow for stale 
prices when the end-of-day NAV is calculated. By raising trading costs to this strategy through a 
redemption fee, funds might be able to reduce this market timing activity. We examine this 
possibility with those funds in our sample that initiate redemption fees. 
 Consider the following regression model that explains daily fund flows10, ft. We use two 
variables to capture the trading signal in the U.S. market as an indicator of international stale 
prices. First, we use the S&P500 index return, , each day. If timing is taking place, flows 
should be positively correlated with this variable. Since a trader would not exchange into a fund 
on successive positive return days, we also use a trading variable, , that captures the 
signal to exchange into or out of a fund only on reversal days. This variable takes on the value of 
1 (-1) when the S&P500 return is positive (negative) following a negative (positive) return day. 
We add the dummy variable, , which takes on a value of 1 to indicate the period prior to 
the redemption fee and interact this dummy variable with the intercept and the slopes. This 
results in the following regression model for daily fund flows: 
tSP500
tSignal
tPreFee
                                                          
10 We verify that the funds do report the correct daily TNA, by matching all funds in the event study sample to the 
SEC’s N-SAR forms, and then following the procedure of Greene and Hodges (2002) to adjust any flow calculations 
for funds that report pre-flow TNA.  Overall, 11 out of 58 funds report pre-flow TNA.  For these 11 funds, we 
therefore calculate flows as: 
ct = at – [(at-1)(rt)], (3) 
where at is total net assets on day t, rt  is the fund’s return on day t, and ct is fund flow on day t.  To get percentage 
flows we then divide (1) by the TNA on day t-1, which is at-1 .   
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ttttttttt eSignalSPPreFeeSignalPreFeeSPPreFeef ++++++= 210210 500500 γγγβββ .  (4) 
A significant positive coefficient for β0 in Equation 4 would indicate that flows are higher 
in the pre-fee period.  A significant positive coefficient for β1 would suggest that flows are 
positively correlated with the S&P 500 index in the pre-fee period, while a significant positive 
coefficient for γ1 indicates that flows are correlated with the S&P 500 index over the entire event 
window.  A significant positive coefficient for β2 indicates the presence of market-timing trades 
in the pre-fee period, while significance for γ2 suggests the same for the entire event window.  
We do not expect all funds to show the same patterns in coefficient significance, as all funds 
show different vulnerability to market-timing traders.  However, if a significant proportion of the 
fund’s daily flows are motivated by strategic traders, this model should explain a significant 
proportion of the flows, and therefore have a high R2. Moreover, if redemption fees are effective 
at limiting strategic trading, then the model parameter estimates in the period prior to the 
redemption fee (β0, β1, and β2) should be positive and significant 
While international fund managers might target the elimination of strategic fund flows, 
they might also be concerned about frequent liquidity flows. We can interpret the residuals from 
equation (4) as the noise- or liquidity-components of daily fund flows. We use the Glesjer (1969) 
test to determine whether the redemption fee changes the variance of the error term. This test 
involves a regression of the absolute value of the error term on an indicator of whether or not the 
fund is charging a redemption fee.  If the redemption fee only eliminates strategic fund flows, 
then we would fail to reject a change in the level of noise trading in the daily fund flows, as 
measured by the variance of the residuals. 
 
3.2 Event Study Empirical Results 
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 Fifty-eight mutual funds in our sample initiate redemption fees during our sample period. 
Figures 1 through 4 provide a graphical representation of absolute daily flows for each 
investment objective before and after the redemption fee is initiated. We could identify no funds 
that eliminated redemption fees during this period. Of the funds initiating redemption fees, 
eighteen are domestic equity growth funds, eight are domestic bond funds, twenty-one are 
international equity funds, and the other eleven are domestic equity income funds. Our figures 
indicate that domestic income funds are the only category that does not experience a sharp 
decrease in the same level of flow volatility after the imposition of a redemption fee. Table 6 
reports statistics on how daily fund flows compare between the 90-day period before the 
redemption fee versus the 90-day period after the redemption fee11.  
 Although daily flows show little change after a redemption fee begins to be charged, their 
standard deviations are significantly reduced for the majority of funds in each investment 
objective, except for domestic income funds. The absolute values of flows are also consistently 
reduced following the imposition of a redemption fee for all objectives except domestic income 
funds.  As columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 document, far more funds exhibit significant decreases 
than increases in absolute flows and flow volatility after the redemption fee is initiated. 
However, there is no clear pattern of change in signed flows. From this evidence it seems that 
redemption fees are effective in reducing the level of daily fund flows without causing a large 
distortion in the overall direction of flows. That is, the initiation of a redemption fee appears to 
neither attract new net assets to the fund nor encourage en masse redemptions from the fund. 
                                                          
11 For robustness, we also repeat all further tests with a correction for the contemporaneous effect of daily flows to 
all funds.  To do this we calculate excess daily flows by subtracting the average daily percentage flow for all funds 
not initiating redemption fees and with the same investment objective from the daily flow for fund i. All results for 
excess daily flows are similar to our results for unadjusted daily flows and are therefore not reported.   
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 Table 7 reports the regression parameter estimates for Equation 4. Consistent with the 
greater vulnerability of international funds to stale pricing, more of the variation is explained for 
flow in international equity funds (25%), and less for domestic bond funds (5%).  Overall, the 
Glesjer test rejects the null of no heteroskedasticity for about half of our sample of funds 
(between 45 and 62 percent), indicating that the redemption fee only sometimes significantly 
lowers the noise or liquidity components of daily fund flows. We find this test to be most 
significant with the predicted sign for international funds (62% positive and significant), which is 
consistent with these funds being most susceptible to trading by market-timers (Greene and 
Hodges, 2002). However, it is possible that our empirical model does not capture all of the 
variation in strategic fund flows and that strategic fund flows still occur after redemption fees are 
initiated. In summary, many of the international funds had daily fund flows that were consistent 
with trading strategies that exploited stale prices. The redemption fee eliminated much of these 
flows. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 We examine how redemption policies affect daily fund flows in open-end mutual funds. 
We find mixed evidence for the argument that fund managers use redemption fees in order to 
“capture” investor dollars. We base this conclusion on the fact that management fees are 
significantly and positively related to the likelihood that a fund will charge a redemption fee, but 
that marketing fees and front-loads are negatively related.  Our cross-sectional comparisons 
provide no evidence that funds charging redemption fees have worse performance.  These 
findings are consistent with redemption fees being used in conjunction with the other marketing 
policies of a fund. If marketing fees do not benefit existing fund shareholders and redemption 
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fees protect long-term shareholders from potential costs associated with trading of fund shares, 
then funds that have the best interest of long-term shareholders at heart might be more likely to 
have lower marketing fees and higher redemption fees as our evidence suggests. 
 We also examine a sample of funds that enacted redemption fees during our sample 
period to determine whether the distribution of daily fund flows changes after the initiation of the 
redemption fee. For funds that experienced large turnover of fund shares that was consistent with 
investor exchanges, we find that redemption fees drastically reduce fund flows. We observed a 
decrease in the magnitude of daily fund flows of 78% for domestic equity funds, 58% for 
international funds, and 77% for domestic bond funds.  Only domestic income funds showed an 
increase in the magnitude of daily flows.  Moreover, redemption fees affected the nature of the 
exchanges. Prior to the fees, several international funds experienced large daily flows consistent 
with strategic trading that would be expected to dilute fund returns. After the redemption fees are 
initiated, strategic flows of this kind are much less evident.  
 In total, our results suggest that redemption fees are effective in reducing the level of 
daily fund flows, especially in international and growth funds. However, our results also suggest 
that many redemption fees are negatively related to a fund’s marketing spending. Although this 
could arise from funds reaching an optimal size and then switching their strategy from attracting 
new investors to simply retaining existing investors, we find no relationship between fund size or 
growth and the tendency to charge a redemption fee. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports averages of fund characteristics for funds with and without redemption fees. Variables are annual 
averages over our sample period from 2000 to 2003.  Expense ratios are decomposed into management (non-12b-1) 
and marketing (12b-1) components. Alpha is the intercept from a market model of monthly returns for fund i, with 
the S&P 500 index as a benchmark for domestic growth and income funds.  The MSCI EAFE index is the 
benchmark for international equity funds and the Federal Reserve’s AA Aggregate Corporate Bond index is the 
benchmark for bond funds. All variables are percentages, except fund size, which is in millions of dollars. * and ** 
indicate significant differences between funds with and without redemption fees at the 5- and 1-percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 International Equity Domestic Growth Domestic Income Domestic Bond 
Annual Return  
(with redemption fee) 
-4.79 21.71** -5.76 26.78* 
(w/o redemption fee) -13.71 -7.87** -6.65 28.69* 
Alpha 
(with redemption fee) 
0.5547** 0.8987** 0.3826 0.4114 
(w/o redemption fee) 0.2782** 0.3838** 0.3554 0.4217 
Management Fee 
(with redemption fee) 
1.34 1.12 0.54** 0.51** 
(w/o redemption fee) 1.44 1.12 0.89** 0.71** 
Marketing Fee 
(with redemption fee) 
0.26** 0.25** 0.27** 0.26** 
(w/o redemption fee) 0.45** 0.40** 0.40** 0.36** 
Size ($Millions) 
(with redemption fee) 
185.49 327.85 679.11 370.28* 
(w/o redemption fee) 264.95 353.26 452.07 212.44* 
Turnover 
(with redemption fee) 
91.65 127.76 31.64** 120.65 
(w/o redemption fee) 99.58 111.84 73.06** 94.42 
Cash Holdings 
(with redemption fee) 
3.55 5.07 1.80** 4.58 
(w/o redemption fee) 4.42 4.73 3.52** 3.89 
Front Load 
(with redemption fee) 
0.30** 0.36** 0.00** 0.12** 
(w/o redemption fee) 1.36** 1.38** 1.32** 1.36** 
Deferred Load 
(with redemption fee) 
1.21 0.90* 0.85 0.79 
(w/o redemption fee) 1.42 1.16* 1.17 1.05 
Daily Flow 
(with redemption fee) 
0.0366 0.0950* 0.0466 0.0831 
(w/o redemption fee) -0.0018 0.0255** 0.0160 0.0394 
Absolute Daily Flow 
(with redemption fee) 
0.5955* 0.4595 0.3072 0.3452 
(w/o redemption fee) 0.8603* 0.4530 0.3097 0.3472 
N 
(with redemption fee) 
53 80 16 41 
(w/o redemption fee) 357 1510 565 1947 
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 Table 2: Redemption Fee Characteristics 
 
This table presents statistics on the short-term redemption fees charged by the funds in our sample each year. 
Redemption fee data is from Lipper, Inc. Fund investment objectives are from the CRSP mutual fund database.  
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total International 
Equity Funds: 
 
388 483 529 682 
Funds charging a 
redemption fee: 
33 
(8.5%) 
85 
(17.6%) 
114 
(21.6%) 
252 
(37.0%) 
Average fee (%): 1.59 1.87 1.90 1.88 
Redemption fees set at 
2%: 
21 
(63.6%) 
74 
(87.1%) 
103 
(90.4%) 
225 
(89.3%) 
Total Domestic 
Growth Funds: 
1,115 1,502 1,736 2,201 
Funds charging a 
redemption fee: 
57 
(5.1%) 
99 
(6.6%) 
159 
(9.2%) 
250 
(11.4%) 
Average fee (%): 1.56 1.78 1.84 1.86 
Redemption fees set at 
2%: 
33 
(57.9%) 
73 
(73.7%) 
132 
(83.0%) 
216 
(86.4%) 
Total Domestic Income 
Funds: 
427 525 604 743 
Funds charging a 
redemption fee: 
9 
(2.1%) 
16 
(3.0%) 
24 
(4.0%) 
45 
(6.1%) 
Average fee (%): 1.36 1.89 1.78 1.84 
Redemption fees set at 
2%: 
5 
(55.6%) 
14 
(87.5%) 
19 
(79.2%) 
38 
(84.4%) 
Total Domestic Bond 
Funds: 
1,132 1,672 2,020 2,255 
Funds charging a 
redemption fee: 
33 
(2.9%) 
41 
(2.5%) 
87 
(4.3%) 
116 
(5.1%) 
Average fee (%): 1.57 1.54 1.62 1.71 
Redemption fees set at 
2%: 
20 
(60.6%) 
26 
(63.4%) 
58 
(66.7%) 
87 
(75.0%) 
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Table 3:  Probit Analysis of Redemption Fees  
 
This table reports ordered probit parameter estimates. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a 
fund has a redemption fee, and equal to zero otherwise. Chi-squared statistics are given in parentheses. The model 
is:  
Redemption Fee Dummyi = β0 + β1Alphai + β2ManagementFeesi + β3MarketingFeesi + β4Size + β5Turnover + 
β6CashHoldings + β7FrontLoadi + ei.
Alpha is the intercept from a market model of monthly returns for fund i, with the S&P 500 index as a benchmark 
for domestic growth and income funds.  The MSCI EAFE index is the benchmark for international equity funds and 
the Federal Reserve’s AA Aggregate Corporate Bond index is the benchmark for bond funds.  MarketingFees is the 
12b-1 portion of fund i’s expense ratio, and ManagementFees is the non-12b-1 portion. Turnover is the fund’s 
turnover ratio. Size is the natural log of a fund’s average monthly total net assets. Cash Holdings is the percentage of 
a fund’s holdings in cash and cash equivalents. The Pseudo R2 calculation is from McFadden (1974).  * and ** 
indicate significant coefficients at the 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 International 
Equity 
Domestic Growth Domestic Income Domestic Bond 
Intercept -0.0349 
(0.00) 
-1.1090** 
(12.84) 
-0.3175 
(0.18) 
-1.7138** 
(14.38) 
Alpha 34.3469*  
(5.79) 
28.5191** 
(14.14) 
-12.2871 
(0.13) 
-54.2755 
(1.57) 
Management Fees 19.3251 
(1.97) 
30.1096* 
(4.23) 
8.2510 
(0.17) 
5.1094 
(0.04) 
Marketing Fees -294.4690** 
(34.74) 
-204.7545** 
(34.46) 
-267.3008** 
(7.17) 
-195.6937** 
(13.35) 
Size -0.0133 
(0.03) 
-0.0259 
(0.33) 
-0.1086 
(1.28) 
0.1388* 
(5.11) 
Turnover 0.0508 
(0.53) 
0.0051  
(0.02) 
-0.8436 
(3.31) 
0.0698  
(1.89) 
Cash Holdings -0.0360 
(1.37) 
-0.0075 
(0.72) 
-0.1004 
(2.35) 
-0.0205 
(1.22) 
Front Load -27.3871** 
(21.12) 
-20.2673** 
(26.44) 
-1705.4140  
(0.00) 
-33.3181** 
(15.77) 
Pseudo R2 29.3% 23.5% 26.3% 28.1% 
 
  
Table 4:  Probit Analysis of Redemption Fees and Deferred Loads 
This table reports ordered probit parameter estimates. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund has a redemption fee, and equal to zero 
otherwise. Chi-squared statistics are given in parentheses. The model is:  
Redemption Fee Dummyi = β0 + β1Alphai + β2ManagementFeesi + β3MarketingFeesi + β4Size + β5Turnover + β6CashHoldings + β7FrontLoadi + ei.
Alpha is the intercept from a market model of monthly returns for fund i, with the S&P 500 index as a benchmark for domestic growth and income funds.  The 
MSCI EAFE index is the benchmark for international equity funds and the Federal Reserve’s AA Aggregate Corporate Bond index is the benchmark for bond 
funds.  MarketingFees is the 12b-1 portion of fund i’s expense ratio, and ManagementFees is the non-12b-1 portion.. Turnover is the fund’s turnover ratio. Size is 
the natural log of a fund’s average monthly total net assets. Cash Holdings is the percentage of a fund’s holdings in cash and cash equivalents. The Pseudo R2 
calculation is from McFadden (1974).  * and ** indicate significant coefficients at the 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 International Equity  Domestic Growth  Domestic Income   Domestic Bond  
 With Deferred 
Load 
No Deferred 
Load 
With Deferred 
Load 
No Deferred 
Load 
With Deferred 
Load 
No Deferred 
Load 
With Deferred 
Load 
No Deferred 
Load 
Intercept 5.5884*  
(7.48) 
-1.8702 
(3.73) 
3.2686** 
(18.46) 
-1.7792** 
(11.28) 
6.7112*  
(5.23) 
-1.5009 
(1.41) 
-1.1796 
(1.22) 
-2.4760** 
(7.70) 
Alpha -12.6101 
(0.05) 
0.4957  
(0.00) 
24.4421  
(2.63) 
-5.3202 
(0.19) 
-127.7069 
(1.86) 
19.4243  
(0.16) 
36.9717  
(0.05) 
-53.8305 
(0.45) 
Management 
Fees 
36.2401  
(0.63) 
16.0102  
(0.44) 
-101.5437** 
(12.43) 
32.7748  
(1.68) 
55.4512  
(0.51) 
96.0750  
(2.24) 
-197.8085** 
(8.01) 
34.1980  
(0.35) 
Marketing Fees -1304.213** 
(16.99) 
122.376  
(1.18) 
-585.5844** 
(96.02) 
-81.2922  
(0.61) 
-1072.739* 
(6.35) 
-215.6399 
(0.59) 
-648.2235** 
(33.63) 
-36.1622 
(0.06) 
Size -0.2358 
(0.72) 
-0.0507 
(0.12) 
-0.1153 
(1.39) 
-0.0243 
(0.14) 
-0.3810 
(1.65) 
-0.0619 
(0.16) 
0.3099*  
(5.10) 
-0.0019 
(0.00) 
Turnover 0.0245  
(0.01) 
-0.0470 
(0.50) 
0.2175  
(1.97) 
0.0070  
(0.03) 
-1.1629 
(0.48) 
-0.3319 
(0.33) 
0.2677* 
 (4.58) 
0.1652** 
(7.43) 
Cash Holdings 0.0668  
(0.42) 
0.0414  
(0.59) 
0.0187  
(1.81) 
0.0013  
(0.02) 
-0.0936 
(0.16) 
-0.0352 
(0.25) 
-0.0259 
(0.32) 
-0.0130 
(0.18) 
Front Load -29.0492 
(3.48) 
-396.4729 
(0.00) 
-31.2684 
(3.49) 
-12.8375** 
(7.43) 
-1487.691 
(0.00) 
-369.0924 
(0.00) 
-1954.427 
(0.00) 
-15.6881 
(2.64) 
Pseudo R2 86.7% 26.5% 68.3% 7.6% 75.1% 21.5% 75.9% 13.1% 
N 181 179 602 988 221 360 665 1276 
 
Table 5, Panel A: Daily Fund Flows Conditional on Trading Restrictions 
  
Daily fund flow statistics are reported for sub-samples portioned by investment restrictions and redemption fees, as of year-end 2003. Funds with ‘purchase 
constraints’ are those funds that are closed to new investors, closed to all investors, or are restricted to certain groups of investors. We conduct a t-test of the null 
hypothesis that the means between the two sub-samples are the same, and an F-test that the standard deviations of the two groups are the same. * represent 
significance at the 1% level and ** at the 5% level. Minimum Initial Investments, loads, and purchase constraints are from the CRSP mutual fund database while 
flows and redemption fees are from Lipper. 
 International Equity  Domestic Growth Domestic Income Domestic Bond  
 Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N 
With redemption  
fee 
0.0961** 0.2195* 252 0.0726 0.1782** 250 0.0491 0.1701** 45 0.0395* 0.1442 116 
Without redemption  
fee 
0.0474** 0.2460* 430 0.0543 0.2069** 1951 0.0378 0.1041** 698 0.0077* 0.1625 2139 
Minimum Initial 
Investment < $1,000 
0.0841 0.2596** 223 0.0615 0.2200** 751 0.0370 0.1984** 258 0.0094 0.1539** 824 
Minimum Initial 
Investment > $1,000 
0.0563 0.2150** 459 0.0537 0.1583** 1450 0.0393 0.1475** 485 0.0093 0.1402** 1431 
With front-end  
load 
0.0845 0.2365 212 0.0671 0.1878 603 0.0601 0.2052** 194 0.0130 0.1455 758 
Without front-end  
load 
0.0568 0.2277 470 0.0523 0.1793 1598 0.0309 0.1504** 549 0.0074 0.1453 1497 
With deferred  
load 
0.0493 0.2197 334 0.0343** 0.1720** 807 0.0289 0.1802* 270 0.0085 0.1555** 787 
Without deferred  
load 
0.0808 0.2400 348 0.0691** 0.1860** 1394 0.0440 0.1586* 473 0.0098 0.1397** 1468 
 
With purchase  
constraints 
0.0534 0.2002** 204 0.0572 0.1702** 629 0.0360 0.1487** 228 0.0142 0.1644** 
 
605 
Without purchase 
constraints 
0.0705 0.2425** 478 0.0560 0.1862** 1572 0.0396 0.1744** 515 0.0076 0.1377** 1650 
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Table 5, Panel B: Absolute Daily Fund Flows Conditional on Trading Restrictions 
  
Daily fund flow statistics are reported for sub-samples partitioned by investment restrictions and redemption fees, as of year-end 2003. Funds with ‘purchase 
constraints’ are those funds that are closed to new investors, closed to all investors, or are restricted to certain groups of investors. We conduct a t-test of the null 
hypothesis that the means between the two sub-samples are the same, and an F-test that the standard deviations of the two groups are the same. * represent 
significance at the 1% level and ** at the 5% level. Minimum initial investments, loads, and purchase constraints are from the CRSP mutual fund database while 
flows and redemption fees are from Lipper. 
 
 International Equity  Domestic Growth  Domestic Income  Domestic Bond  
 Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. 
Dev. 
N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N 
With redemption  
fee 
0.6544 1.3280** 252 0.3783 0.7425** 250 0.3320 0.4997* 45 0.3192 0.3128** 116 
Without redemption  
fee 
0.7244 0.8751** 430 0.3611 0.3763** 1951 0.2782 0.3835* 698 0.2971 0.2036** 2139 
Minimum Initial 
Investment < $1,000 
0.6858 1.1175 223 0.5093** 1.1396** 751 0.3499* 0.7758** 258 0.3271** 0.4052** 824 
Minimum Initial 
Investment > $1,000 
0.7047 1.2116 459 
 
0.2873** 0.2780** 1450 0.2449* 0.2222** 485 0.2816** 0.2332** 1431 
With front-end  
load 
0.9818** 1.4205** 212 
 
0.3085** 0.3052** 603 0.2685 0.2908** 194 0.2971 0.2824** 758 
Without front-end  
load 
0.5708** 1.0317** 470 0.3836** 0.8116** 1598 0.2860 0.5476** 549 0.2988 0.3205** 1497 
With deferred  
load 
0.4722** 0.7446** 334 
 
0.2614** 0.2510** 807 0.2418* 0.2599** 270 0.2647** 0.1641** 787 
Without deferred  0.9157** 1.4519** 348 0.4219** 0.8668** 1394 0.3040* 0.5852** 473 0.3162** 0.3613** 1468 
 
load  
With purchase  0.4901** 0.4610** 204 0.3474 0.5047** 629 0.2922 0.5947** 228 0.3441** 0.4631** 605 
constraints 
Without purchase 
constraints 
0.7875** 1.3689** 478 0.3693 0.7777** 1572 0.2767 0.4417** 515 0.2814** 0.2240** 1650 
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Table 6: Daily Fund Flows and Redemption Fee Initiations 
The prefee and postfee columns of this table report average daily percentage flows, averaged across funds, for 3-month periods before and after the funds 
initiated redemption fees. The average (across funds) of the standard deviations of daily flows are given in parentheses.  The same statistics for absolute flows are 
given in the next two rows.  The third column gives the percentage of funds with decreasing flows after the initiation of a redemption fee, with the percentage of 
funds with decreasing standard deviations of daily flows given in parentheses.  Statistical tests are conducted for the difference between pre-fee and post-fee 
means (t-test) and standard deviations (F-test) of daily flows, with the percentage of funds yielding significant results (at the 95% level) reported in columns 4 
and 5.     
  
 Prefee  Postfee             Funds with         Funds with         Funds with  
   flow    flow  decreasing  flows        significantly        significantly  
      (%)  increasing flows (%) decreasing flows (%) 
International Equity Funds (N=21)   
Daily Flow   0.0362   -0.0077   52   0   0 
    (0.2118)  (0.2030)   (71)   (10)   (57) 
Absolute Daily Flow  1.6921*  0.7169*   90   0   62 
    (1.8694**) (0.5337**)  (71)   (24)   (67) 
Domestic Growth Funds (N=18)  
Daily Flow    -1.5532  0.0818   39   28   6   
    (4.2427)** (0.2233)**  (72)   (17)   (50) 
Absolute Daily Flow  4.3447*  0.9382*   78   0   50 
    (5.5211)** (0.8143)**  (72)   (17)   (61) 
Domestic Income Funds (N=11)  
Daily Flow    0.2464  0.9679   55   9   0 
    (0.3059)** (2.7146)**  (73)   (27)   (55) 
Absolute Daily Flow  1.1025  1.6745   64   18   36 
    (1.5194)* (3.2911)*  (73)   (27)   (73) 
Domestic Bond Funds (N=8)    
Daily Flow   1.2343  0.0423    88   0   25 
     (3.1492)** (0.2321)**  (75)   (0)   (75) 
Absolute Daily Flow   1.8358  0.4187   88   13   38 
     (3.6910)** (0.2742)**  (75)   (0)   (75) 
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Table 7:  Components of Daily Fund Flows 
 
Simple statistics for coefficient estimates are reported for a time-series model of daily fund flows.   The percentage of funds with positive coefficient estimates is 
reported, as well as the percentage of funds with significant positive and significant negative coefficient estimates (at the 95% level).  The estimated model is 
ttttttttt eSignalSPPreFeeSignalPreFeeSPPreFeef ++++++= 210210 500500 γγγβββ , 
where is the percentage fund flow on day t, is the return on the S&P 500 index, is a market-timing trading signal indicating a signed S&P 
500 return reversal from day t-1 to day t, and is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 on days prior to the redemption fee and zero on days after the 
redemption fee. Based on Glesjer (1969), we also report the estimate for 
tf tSP500 tSignal
tPreFee
1φ  from the model 
ttt uPreFeee ++= 10|| φφ . 
Motivated by the heteroskedasticity indicated by the Glesjer test, weighted least squares are used to estimate the former model. The sample includes 58 funds 
initiating redemption fees over our sample period. 
 
        β  β  β  γ  γ  γ   φ φ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 
 
International Equity funds with positive estimates (%)  33 71 76 38 86 67  100 90 
(N=21)   positive and significant (%)   0 24 10 5 14 19  100 62 
Avg. R2 = 25%  negative and significant (%)   14 5 0 24 0 0  0 0 
 
Domestic Growth  funds with positive estimates (%) 44 61 44 44 67 50  100 78 
(N=18)   positive and significant (%)   6 17 6 6 44 0  100 56 
Avg. R2 = 19%  negative and significant (%)   0 0 0 17 11 0  0 6 
 
Domestic Income  funds with positive estimates (%)  64 64 64 55 73 55  100 73   
(N=11)   positive and significant (%)   0 0 9 9 0 9  91 45 
Avg. R2 = 11%  negative and significant (%)   0 0 0 0 0 0  0 18 
 
Domestic Bond funds with positive estimates (%) 88 63 50 50 37 50  100 88  
(N=8)   positive and significant (%)  13 0 0 0 0 0  100 50 
Avg. R2 = 5%  negative and significant (%)   0  0 0 0 0 0  0 12 
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Figures 1-4 
These figures illustrate average absolute daily fund flows, normalized by daily TNA, for the 90 days before and after a redemption fee was imposed. Day 0 is the 
day when the redemption fee first took effect. 
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